



Building SBOM for System Firmware

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Agenda

- AMI Open-Source Initiatives
- SBOM Overview
- Firmware Supply Chain Challenges
- Strategy
- PoC
- Call-to-Action

AMI IS EMBRACING OPEN SOURCE



Transparency



Reliability



Security

Driving innovation through
open-source

- Encourage adoption of industry standard solutions
- Develop with a community-first approach

SBOM Overview



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Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)

What:

A Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) is a formal record containing the details and supply chain relationships of various components -NTIA










Why:


Compliance: Cybersecurity EO of 2021

Risk Mitigation: Ripple20 – Treck IP stack

SBOM Capabilities


						
INVENTORY TRACKING	SOFTWARE DEPENDENCIES	PROVENANCE	PEDIGREE	VULNERABILITY STATUS	LICENSE ATTRIBUTION	INTEGRITY, AUTHENTICITY
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Component Name- Vendor Name- Version- Unique Identifier	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Ability to visualize dependencies with unidirectional acyclic graphs- Determine components are affected	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Software Origination Details	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Details of changes to software- Vulnerability remediations	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Provides the ability to detail the state of vulnerabilities in the product at the time the SBOM was created.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Avoid copy-left issues- Facilitates license compliance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Mechanisms are supported to ensure SBOM information is authentic.

Firmware Supply Chain Challenges



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Challenges

- Tools and processes still in nascent form
 - Universally adopted software naming convention – PURL?
- SCA challenges
- Patch management
- Vulnerability management
 - Needs to be modern and automated (no more spreadsheets and emails)
- How to begin such an effort, get traction, and build momentum?
- Ubiquity of SBOM - We need build tools that are just as capable of generating an SBOM for source code as they are capable of generate binaries from the code.
- How to handle transparency for binary objects?
 - How to get an SBOM that corresponds to the binary

Transparency via SBOM

Software traverses the supply chain in the form of source code and binaries. An SBOM ecosystem must support the ability to provide an SBOM for the binary or source code representation of the SW.

Consider the flowing approaches:

Method	Benefit	Drawback	Related
Store Complete SBOM in the binary	Not dependent on any other systems to derive complete SBOM	Adds size to the binary object	Embedding coSWID tags in the binary object files https://github.com/hughsie/python-uswid
Store a reference to an SBOM in the binary	Small size, easy to update	Need a system to extract SW IDs Need systems to facilitate fetching BOM for each SWID	Embedding coSWID tags in the binary object https://github.com/hughsie/python-uswid
Measured reference	Little to no size added to binary	Need a system to measure the binary Need a system to cross-reference the measurement with a DB of SWIDs. Need a system to facilitate fetching BOM for each SWID	Intel leverages TPM architecture to implement SBOM: https://uefi.org/node/4261

Strategy

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
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Strategy

- Crawl, Walk then Run
- Identify which use cases matter to the supply chain
 - Start with use cases needed by current organization
 - Create PoCs and socialize
 - Pull in supply chain partners to implement a broader industry wide PoC
 - Sync up on tooling/formats
 - Discover and prioritize use cases of supply chain partners
- Focus on the ability to accurately identify the ingredients in your FW first
 - Good SCA uses snippet checking to find traces of OSS followed by manual investigation to identify versions of that OSS
 - Need to modernize PSIRT/VMS



PoC: Embed SW IDs in a binary



Firmware Volume information

Guid	Offset	Size	Type
FA4974FC-AF1D-4E5D-BDC5-DACD6D27BAEC	00000000	00030000	Fv
A7EDEBD8-A8D7-48F8-81FB-837656B82077	00030000	00030000	Raw
00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000	00060000	00010000	Raw
4F1C52D3-D824-4D2A-A2F0-EC40C23C5916	00070000	00410000	Fv
E4A068F1-5EF1-4ACE-857C-7935F8A0C708	00480000	00110000	Fv
AFDD39F1-19D7-4501-A730-CE5A27E1154B	00590000	00110000	Fv
5B08A058-784F-4938-9A49-1588AA05F4B9	006A0000	000A0000	Fv
00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000	00740000	00090000	Fv
14E428FA-1A12-4875-B637-8B3CC87FDF07	007D0000	000A0000	Fv
00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000	00870000	00090000	Fv
0931F36D-1CE7-4837-9D1A-0DF75C13FA2D	00900000	00070000	Raw
61C0F511-A691-4F54-974F-B9A42172CE53	00970000	00090000	Fv
7BEBD21A-A1E5-4C4C-9CA1-A0C168BCBD9D	00A00000	00070000	Raw
61C0F511-A691-4F54-974F-B9A42172CE53	00A70000	00090000	Fv

67820532-7613-4DD3-9ED7-3D9BE3A7DA63	00001736	Driver	4
899407D7-99FE-43D8-9A21-79EC328CAC21	000C1E9A	Driver	4
CCA91175-03E3-442A-B3B8-2E4A335C1DEA	00005AAA	Driver	4
16D0A23E-C09C-407D-A14A-AD058FDD0CA1	000040CA	Driver	4
9622E42C-8E38-4A08-9E8F-54F784652F6B	00005106	Driver	4
BDCE85BB-FBAA-4F4E-9264-501A2C249581	00003666	Driver	4
FA20568B-548B-4B2B-81EF-1BA08D4A3CEC	00007FA2	Driver	4
28DED685-F733-455F-A840-43A22B791FB3	00000616	Driver	4
00160F8D-2B35-4DF2-BBE0-B272A8D631F0	0000142A	Driver	4
0F23C1F8-4BAC-470C-B6B8-B392D544290A	000041F2	Driver	4
4E82091E-32A1-4689-8A00-CDE41ED63CDD	000020BE	Driver	4
1830A6DD-E03D-4BC0-B115-94D91950FE4A	00007832	Driver	4
B7EE4835-84CE-4B15-BF52-2D11574CE470	000019B6	Driver	4
4A3602B0-1A05-4C82-99B4-588CD2A32CD5	000023CA	Driver	4
76D5CF91-0C55-434E-97C2-D2825C82E610	00000962	Driver	4
2CE5604F-A982-4D2E-8FD0-D1600C2E1515	0000047E	Driver	4
502B04F3-71AB-47B4-BEAE-4736EA190AA4	0000185E	Driver	4
CD1C80D-E6D3-4A42-9229-75F3BEFCF109	0000430A	Driver	4
271B424E-A4CC-4E0E-90A2-7EA4841F12F3	000008AE	Driver	4
580DD900-385D-11D7-883A-00500473D4EB	00011082	Driver	4

Firmware File
System
information
(DXE)
In Nested FV
[Compressed]

Name	Size	Type	Sect
1B45CC0A-156A-428A-AF62-49864DA0E6E6	000000FC	FreeForm	1
5B85965C-455D-4CC6-9C4C-7F086967D2B0	0000003C	FreeForm	1
7352AECB-AAA2-4D3B-8759-C32458B7E8FF	0000114B	Peim	2
7EB7126D-C45E-4BD0-9357-7F507C5C9CF9	00001382	Peim	4
52C05B14-0B98-496C-BC3B-04B50211D680	00005F9E	PeiCore	3
C779F6D8-7113-4AA1-9648-EB1633C7D53B	00001DCE	Peim	4
91B886FD-2636-4FA8-A4A9-2EB04F235E09	0000016E	Peim	4
9962883C-C025-4E8B-B699-4EA4D147C8A8	00001272	Peim	4
79AA6086-035A-4AD9-A89A-A6D5AA27F0E2	0000177E	Peim	4
C1FB0624-27EA-40D1-AA48-94C3DC5C7E0D	000010C6	Peim	4
9EA28D33-0175-4788-BEA8-6950516030A5	0000129A	Peim	4
C7D48BCF-EB0A-4C91-BD8B-FC99F28B011	000002CA	Peim	4
D2ABC888-AE13-4E3B-BCFE-5DE368FA4E72	000005F2	Peim	4
52B3DBA7-9565-48E8-8E13-EC7196721B3C	000005A6	Peim	4
ADF01BF6-47D6-495D-B95B-687777807214	00000A6A	Peim	4
8E199D3F-3A74-492B-8CB3-93D668D87D07	0000054E	Peim	4
1C98780A-C67D-4D9B-A9D8-4AC0487A6D6E	0000044A	Peim	4
CAC3FB95-33F5-4596-818B-68E024DD867B	0000037A	Peim	4
968C1D9F-80C4-43B7-8CAE-668AA56C4E71	00000742	Peim	4
0FE9DA53-043D-4265-A94D-FD77FEDE2EB4	000005CA	Peim	4
0135229A-EBB5-4A21-957D-1D20057CF751	00000D5A	Peim	4
B12BF2D5-05A7-4CAC-8210-0FED4B3CD67D	000003E6	Peim	4

Firmware File
System
information
(PEI)

[illegible]

SBOM Information

```
[uSWID]
Product = 'Aptio'
Module = 'IsRecovery'
git-repo =
'git@git.ami.com:bootfirmware/aptiov/bkc/cfl.git'
git-commit =
'624605f0a4a883a9ae41fc77078a1c6973bb78a0'
```

```
[uSWID-Entity]
[uSWID-Entity.Distributor]
Name = 'One AMI'
RegId = 'ami.com'
extra-roles = ['Licensor', 'Maintainer', 'Software Creator']


[uSWID-Entity.TagCreator]
Name = 'One AMI'
RegId = 'ami.com'
extra-roles = []
```




Advertisement and Discovery

```
git-repo = 'git@git.ami.com:bootfirmware/aptiov/bkc/cfl.git'  
git-commit = '624605f0a4a883a9ae41fc77078a1c6973bb78a0'
```

SWID Info




Eco-centric Automation





An Open SBOM Ecosystem





CALL TO ACTION

Build an expanded PoC

➤ *Cross-vendor SBOM consumption tool*

- ✓ *Silicon Vendors (IHV)*
- ✓ *IFV*
- ✓ *ODM*
- ✓ *OEM*
- ✓ *Point of Use (PoU)*

Contact [AMI](https://ami.com/contact) (ami.com/contact)



Resources

Executive Order Related: Why we must do it:

- <https://www.nist.gov/itl/executive-order-14028-improving-nations-cybersecurity>
- https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/sbom_minimum_elements_report.pdf

Ripple20: Why we should do it.

- <https://www.jsf-tech.com/disclosures/ripple20/>

Who is using SBOM and why:

- https://linuxfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/LFResearch_SBOM_Report_final.pdf

Good intro to SBOM use cases:

- OWASP SBOM Use Cases: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PNYyMpUey7Y>

Good info on industry wide proof-of-concepts and much more generic SBOM info

- <https://www.cisa.gov/cisa-sbom-rama>

Methods/Tools for associating SBOMs with binaries:

- <https://github.com/hughsie/python-uswid> (LVFS/Redhat/Richard Hughes' embedded coSWID tags solution)
- <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-21.txt>
- <https://uefi.org/node/4261> (Intel's approach with TPM/RIM)

Proof of concept

- <https://toml.io/en/v1.0.0>
- <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CBOR>
- https://www.ntia.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_sbom_sharing_exchanging_sboms-10feb2021.pdf (Advertisement and Discovery)

VEX

- https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/framing_2021-04-29_002.pdf

SBOM Tooling Info:

- <https://cyclonedx.org/tool-center/>
- <https://spdx.dev/resources/tools/>

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Thank you!






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Backup

VEX

VEX + SBOM example

- Software includes a vulnerable component
- SW supplier determines that the vuln doesn't affect the built software
 - E.g., relevant code isn't included by compiler
 - E.g., relevant code is present, but not used or exposed
- Supplier issues a VEX with the claim that the component is "not affected" and no action is required
- Consumer integrates SBOM data, vulnerability data, and VEX data to make some risk-based decision



https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/framing_2021-04-29_002.pdf