



OPEN
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Ownership Transfer

Where security meets the circular economy


Jeff Andersen (Google)



Agenda


- Exploring the concept of "ownership"
- Exploring the circular economy
- Methods of ownership transfer

Ownership: Identity Endorsement




UDS = unique device secret
FMC = first mutable code

Ownership: Identity Endorsement



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




Ownership: Identity Endorsement

- Does not impact on-device state management
- Does not impact the device's behavior
 - Only affects the trustworthiness of the device's attestations

Ownership: Configuration Management







Ownership: Configuration Management

- Impacts the device's behavior
- Impacts on-device state management
- **Is the subject of ownership transfer**


Circular Economy




Circular Economy and Statefulness



Circular Economy and Statefulness



Circular Economy and Statefulness




Ownership transfer definition

- **Persistent device configuration, updateable by mutually-distrusting entities**
 - At time $T=0$, device is controlled by the manufacturer
 - At time $T=1$, device is controlled by the DC operator
 - At time $T=2$, device is controlled by the second-hand purchaser
 - ...
- What ownership transfer is not:
 - Device identity endorsement
 - Unauthenticated commands (ex: changing storage disk encryption keys)

Vendor control over devices

- Ownership transfer is not about giving *total* control to owners
- Vendors may wish to exert ongoing control over device behavior
 - Example: CPUs that only boot vendor-signed microcode
- The spec has an explicit carve-out for vendor control
 - Vendors might not "own" the device, but they control many of its aspects



Ownership transfer goals

Support two competing interests:

- Secure device configuration management
 - **"When the device is mine, it does what I say."**
- Healthy circular economy
 - **"I can easily sell the device to whomever I want."**

Ownership transfer on a spectrum

Fewer security assurances given to owners
Fewer circular economy roadblocks

Stronger security assurances given to owners
Greater circular-economy roadblocks



No ownership transfer

Physical-presence
ownership transfer

Authenticated
ownership transfer



Not all devices need ownership transfer

- Some devices only need vendor-managed configuration
 - Ex: devices that only ever run vendor firmware
- Caliptra is an example
 - An iRoT that only boots vendor-signed firmware


Physical-presence ownership transfer

- Assert some pin to prove to the device that a prospective owner is physically present
 - Device then accepts a new configuration
- Resell is conceptually simple: buyer receives part, asserts physical presence, pushes their config
 - **Devil is in the details:** how to assert physical presence across a multitude of device models and form-factors


Authenticated ownership transfer

- Device configuration updated via signed tickets
 - "Configuration ownership" is conferred by way of controlling a private key
 - Physical control is not enough to assert ownership
- **Resell is much more complex:** seller and buyer must coordinate to ensure the buyer can ingest the device
 - Seller and buyer do not always know each other's identity

Terminology: DevUpdtK



Ownership transfer via handshake



Legend

Nonce

Public key


Private key




When we don't know who the next owner is

Two options:

- Transition the device into an "unowned" state before shipping
 - Provision an empty/null DevUpdtK_{pub} to the device
- Use a "service key"
 - A temporary key used to ferry ownership from one entity to another






Handling RMA and Decom

- These flows all assume that ownership transfer can occur before the device leaves possession of the current owner
 - This assumption does not hold in two common cases
- **RMA:** Assembly is broken; techs ship it back to the vendor
 - The *device* is functional and may return to the owner, but it was unreachable when the assembly left the owner
- **Decom:** Rack is powered down, and later stripped for parts
 - Decision to decom is not made until after the rack is powered down


Approach: deferred ownership transfer

- Make ownership-transfer nonces long-lived
 - Call them "**ownership epochs**" instead
 - May be deterministic based on an internal monotonic counter
- Owners pre-fetch device ownership epochs
 - Store them in a database
- Owners can generate and sign an ownership transfer ticket *after* the device goes out the door
 - Signed tickets are transferred to the subsequent owner out-of-band



Legend

- Epoch
- Public key
- Signature




Legend


Epoch

Public key

Signature



Clients pull down any tickets needed to take ownership of devices they have acquired



Challenges with ownership transfer

- Device-side implementation questions
 - Storage substrate: fuses vs flash
 - Where and how to route a physical-presence signal
- Coordination problems - central databases are tricky
 - Database reliability
 - Owner reliability
 - Ownership transfer confidentiality

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
Authenticated
ownership transfer

Volatile ownership
authorization

Volatile ownership authorization


- DevUpdtK_{pub} is provisioned into the device on every cold boot
 - Latched into device RAM
 - Authorizes runtime device configuration updates
- Device attests to its current DevUpdtK_{pub}
 - Owners can refuse to admit a misconfigured device into a serving state
- Device is "cryptographically stateless" w.r.t. config management
 - Owners can yank power and sell the device on, with no fuss

DICE in Caliptra



DICE in Caliptra

- **Co-signs Caliptra firmware**
- **Latched into Caliptra RAM on cold-boot**
- **Authorizes runtime Caliptra updates**



Current status

- High-level ownership transfer document under revision and review
 - Physical-presence ownership transfer is preferred
 - Authenticated ownership transfer is deprioritized
 - Volatile ownership authorization will be under discussion

Ownership Transfer

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Thanks!
Q&A

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